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CRITICAL ABORTION
LITIGATION
DENNIS J. HORAN, ESQUIRE
Abortion is a topic that never seems to leave us irrespective of how
often or how long it is litigated. Moreover, the issues do not become sim-
pler. Rather, the subject becomes more complex. The two cases argued
last week before the U.S. Supreme Court by my colleague, Victor Rosen-
blum, were quite complex. They involved the Social Security Act, (Title
XIX)1 and no one seems to know much about what it means. In 1977,
Maher,2 Beal,' and Poelker decided some very important issues with re-
spect to federal funding of abortions as well as whether hospitals could be
forced to provide abortion facilities under the fourteenth amendment.
The McRae5 and Zbaraz6 cases, which I will discuss in a moment, will
have impact in all of those areas.
I have not prepared a text today, but will gladly supply to anyone
who wishes it, an update on all of these cases. Our organization, "Ameri-
cans United for Life," is preparing a newsletter for circulation which will
contain summations and citations of all of the funding cases. We also will
supply copies of the briefs in the McRae and Zbaraz cases to anyone who
requests them. Our office is at 230 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Illinois,
60601, and if you wish to request them by telephone, the number is (213)
263-5386. Just explain that you want the most recent newsletter or copies
of the briefs in McRae and Zbaraz and we will be glad to supply them.
"Americans United for Life" (AUL) is an educational organization
with activities divided into two areas. First, we do educational work, pub-
lishing a pamphlet entitled Studies in Law and Medicine. We also pub-
lish books such as Death, Dying, and Euthanasia, and hold educational
conferences such as the recent psychological conference on abortion. The
conference papers are published and are then available for citation. We
42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
B McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom., Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980).
' Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill.), stay denied, 442 U.S. 1309 (1979).
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publish a newsletter called Lex Vitae, which keeps everyone current on
abortion and other life-related issues, not only in America, but around
the world. We presently are publishing a new book on abortion, New Per-
spectives on Human Abortion, which will be available in January or Feb-
ruary of 1981. We also are preparing a conference on the treatment of the
defective child. Abortion has set the ground work for euthana-
sia-another battle in which we are engaged very heavily. That confer-
ence will be held in Chicago on December 6, 1980 and will feature world
renowned scholars speaking on a subject of interest to every Pro-Lifer.
Legally, AUL acts as a resource center in abortion and other human
life litigation. We collect all of the legislative material, all of the case re-
ports from various parts of the country and keep people in the movement
advised. We also have a very active legal defense fund. We maintain four
full-time attorneys who do nothing except abortion litigation. Unfortu-
nately, often we learn too late that an abortion case has begun and cannot
in any way intervene. We file, perhaps, only amicus briefs which are ef-
fective only if federal judges read them. In any event, I just attended the
European conference on abortion. Europa Pro Vita held a "world con-
gress" on abortion and invited representatives of all European nations to
discuss the European situation. There is great similarity between the situ-
ation in our country and the one in Europe. Although they are about 10
years behind us in terms of many legal developments, abortion is develop-
ing in the same way. For example, abortion was made legal in Italy by
their Supreme Court upon certain conditions not dissimilar to those
which our own Court imposed. The Italian Pro-Life groups are attempt-
ing to attack that case on the basis of a referendum, a means not availa-
ble to us. As in the United States, however, they have different Pro-Life
groups, each desiring different language in the referendum. These differ-
ences have stalled the completion of the referendum because its language
is as essential as the language of a constitutional amendment under our
system.
In 1967, England enacted a statute legalizing abortion under certain
conditions. It developed into abortion on demand. Recently, Pro-Life pro-
ponents in England tried to limit some of the excesses that had developed
by proposing a plan which limited abortions after 24 weeks. A private
members bill was introduced, but as a result of parliamentary procedures
the government prevented the bill from going to a vote in Parliament. I
spoke to a lawyer from Holland who said that abortion is absolutely and
unequivocally illegal there. Yet, it is absolutely and unequivocally availa-
ble on demand everywhere. As he listened to the people discussing meth-
ods to remedy these situations, he became very frustrated. For example,
he heard one person speak about electing Pro-Life members to the gov-
ernment. He noted that in Holland, however, members are not elected to
the government, a party is elected. Consequently, members do not reveal
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their personal positions on difficult subjects such as abortion. The public
votes for a party platform, but none of the parties has anything in their
platforms about abortion. He also discussed prosecution of abortionists.
Since the law is clear in Holland and since abortion on demand is equally
clear, the question was raised: why not have it prosecuted? He explained
that only the minister can prosecute, and the minister will not prosecute
for abortions. That depressing story can be repeated over and over again.
The people in Europe are struggling in their attempt to solve these
problems. It is difficult to deal with abortion here, but upon visiting Eu-
rope we realize that in America there are ways in which Pro-Life activi-
ties can be channeled to produce results. We can elect Pro-Life members
to Congress; we can institute lawsuits to produce some kind of social
change; we can be active in the courts. Most of those options seem to be
unavailable in many of the European countries because of the nature of
their governments. A referendum is a good, direct method and perhaps
the people in Italy will enjoy success with it.
My topic is critical abortion litigation, and there is still a gieat deal
of critical abortion litigation occurring. I will try to outline some of the
cases and, as I said, if you will call our office, we will supply a detailed
outline. In McRae, Judge Dooling held the Hyde Amendment unconstitu-
tional. Similarly, in Zbaraz, Judge Grady declared the Hyde Amendment
unconstitutional. These cases are very significant and go far beyond the
abortion issue. They have become very significant for a large segment of
the American population. In both, our organization, AUL, was involved as
a litigant.
In Zbaraz, we became involved on behalf of two physicians who were
granted standing by the court, and litigated as a party. In McRae, we
became involved on behalf of two sets of intervenors-three members of
the Congress and an individual who was appointed guardian of the un-
born child. It was very significant in this litigation to be a party and
therefore control the case. We have become expert in the social security
and funding cases, having been involved in over thirty, with a record of
no wins and over thirty losses. Even those cases where something was
accomplished at the trial level were quickly reversed on appeal. It is ex-
tremely difficult to litigate within the parameters of Roe v. Wade.7 We
must be able to stand before a court and argue the following: given the
fact that Roe v. Wade has made abortion a fundamental right for a wo-
man, this case is distinguishable. We must try to persuade the court why
such and such is not the case and why we should win. Although we some-
times are successful initially, we often fail in the federal courts of appeal.
We have been very successful intervenors, however, having litigated
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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at least twelve cases in which courts have permitted us to intervene as
parties. Thus, we have created our own precedents and can cite our own
cases. Basically, it is simply a matter of convincing the federal judges that
fairness requires both sides to be heard. That is as profound as the stand-
ing issue is in our courts. The federal judges usually sense at the outset
what they will do in these cases, but they have learned (at least in the
Midwest) that without us, they do not enjoy a good explication of the
issues. To illustrate, the American Civil Liberties Union recently filed a
suit against the new amendments of the 1975 Illinois Abortion Act. Ini-
tially, a temporary restraining order usually is granted before anyone has
had a chance to learn that the case exists. We appeared early and the
judge quickly announced that he was aware from seeing other reported
abortion cases that without us there would not be a good explication of
the issues. Frequently in these abortion cases, the attorney general or the
state's attorney is completely lost. Therefore, we write the brief, provide
them with it, and they adopt most of it as their own.
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Maher, Beal, and Poelker. We
considered these to be significant cases. The Poelker case allowed private
institutions to determine whether they would perform abortions or pro-
vide facilities for the performance of abortions. The Court even went so
far under Poelker as to allow public institutions the same right. Beal ad-
dressed itself to funding. It indicated that no fundamental right existed
for anyone to secure federal money for an abortion or for any kind of
medical treatment. What has happened since then?
In Beal, one Justice noted that the funding issue was decided on a
statutory basis.8 He said, however, that if the situation were such that a
state was depriving women of medically necessary abortions, this whole
statutory issue might be different.9 That statement has given birth to at
least thirty cases in state and federal courts and before administrative
agencies which ultimately have reached the Supreme Court. Our clever
opponents consistently have convinced the courts that the principles
enunciated in Maher, Beal, and Poelker apply only to elective abortions.
Any abortion that is medically necessary, they argue, falls outside the pa-
rameter of those cases. The issue now before the Court is: must the states
fund medically necessary abortions?
The Court will face six issues in McRae and Zbaraz. Does Title XIX
and the federal regulations that have been issued thereunder require all
medically necessary abortions to be funded? If so, when the federal gov-
ernment does not reimburse as a result of the Hyde Amendment, are
states still required to fund all medically necessary abortions through the
8 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 443 (1977).
" Id. at 444.
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use of their own funds? Adjunctly, are states required to pay for all nec-
essary medical procedures?
The last issue I have mentioned has surfaced in abortion cases but
goes far beyond the abortion issue. In Beal, the Court indicated that a
system of cooperative federalism exists between the states and the federal
government with respect to Social Security. The states were free to devise
a plan for the reimbursement of indigents' medical needs based upon rea-
sonableness. The federal government or the Department of Health Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW) also could authorize such a plan. That plan
would not require the federal government or the states to fund all medi-
cally necessary procedures. It is important to appreciate the difference
between what Medicaid now pays and what it would be required to pay if
it were to pay for all medically necessary procedures.
For example, one case dealt with the question whether trans-sexual
surgery was medically necessary and thus covered by Medicaid. HEW
had always maintained that a state or the federal government was not
required to pay for all medically necessary procedures. It was only re-
quired that a reasonable plan be adopted and followed by the state. HEW
changed its position in the trans-sexual surgery case and decided (as indi-
cated in the famous footnote twenty-three in the Zbaraz case) that Title
XIX contemplates that the state or the federal government, depending
upon the reimbursement plan provided, must fund all medically neces-
sary procedures. In the state of Illinois, our attorney general recognized
that this requirement would double the cost of Medicaid in our state.
Other attorneys general around the country have finally realized the sig-
nificance of that issue. It is not just whether medically necessary abor-
tions must be funded, but whether all medically necessary treatment
must be funded.
The next issue is the statutory effect of the Hyde Amendment.' ° Is it
a substantive amendment to the Social Security Act? That is difficult to
determine. The Hyde Amendment altered the appropriations bill first
passed in 1976. The courts are loathe to conclude that the substantive
character of a statute can be changed by an amendment to an appropria-
tions bill. The First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all
held that the Hyde Amendment is a substantive amendment to the Social
Security Act. The reason is simple. There is a practical conclusion that
one reaches when studying this issue. The federal courts have consistently
decided that the states must fund all medically necessary abortions under
Title XIX. Having done so, they then try to determine the effect of the
Hyde Amendment because the federal government has determined that it
will pay for only a small number of these abortions. This means that the
"0 Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976).
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costs incurred by a state will increase dramatically because it will now
pay for most of the costs itself. Under the theory of cooperative federal-
ism, the federal judges have said "it is not practical, it is not reasonable,
we will do this instead: we will call the Hyde Amendment a substantive
amendment to Title XIX and, therefore, the states need fund only up to
the extent of the Hyde Amendment. If they want to do more, they are
free to do so, but they are required to fund to the same extent that the
Hyde Amendment funds." The cases are then sent back for consideration
by the trial court as to whether the Hyde Amendment is constitutional.
The Grady ruling is significant to us as lawyers because we were in
the anomalous position of appearing before the court and reminding it
that the Hyde Amendment was not at issue in the case, that it was not in
the pleadings, that there was no relief requested against it, and that there
were no requests by the plaintiffs that its constitutionality be examined.
Indeed, even the plaintiffs reminded the judge after the remand order
that they were seeking no relief against the Hyde Amendment. Nonethe-
less, the government was notified that the Hyde Amendment or a federal
statute was at issue. They intervened, and the court held that the Hyde
Amendment was unconstitutional. One must realize how strange it feels
to lose an issue which is not even in the case, which is not in the plead-
ings, and which the other side does not contest. They agreed because of a
tactical decision. If they struck down the state statutes as unconstitu-
tional, but convinced the court to agree that the statutory side of the
question requires the states to fund, they win-because all abortions
would be funded. They wanted to avoid a collision with the Hyde Amend-
ment. Why? Because the Hyde Amendment involves Congress and most
cases were being litigated for the plaintiffs by congressionally funded or-
ganizations. They are also prohibited from litigating abortion cases.
Nonetheless, these federally funded organizations have brought about
this result.
The last issue concerns Congress' power over the purse strings and
whether the Hyde Amendment is constitutional. There must be thirty de-
cisions in the lower federal courts and in the federal appellate courts in
this area, but only one, Doe v. Matthews," a New Jersey case, concerns
this particular issue. In Doe, Judge Buinno referred to the issue of appro-
priations and the significance of an appropriations bill. Article I of the
federal constitution states that "no money shall be drawn from the trea-
sury but in consequence of appropriations made by law."'12 Even in cases
where we inserted the appropriations issue in the briefs, it has never been
examined by the courts. It was used and argued, however, very promi-
" 420 F. Supp. 865 (D.N.J. 1976).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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nently in the briefs before the United States Supreme Court. Basically
the issue is this: during the history of our Republic, no appropriations bill
has ever been held violative of any article of the Bill of Rights. The fa-
mous Lovett case'" comes close but is clearly distinguishable because it
involved an ex post facto bill. In addition, even in those cases where the
courts have attacked the validity of an appropriations bill, they have
never authorized a remedy."' These decisions have never said that Con-
gress must appropriate money to correct what we think is wrong. That
issue is now before the Court. So the Court must face a quandary: is the
Hyde Amendment a substantive amendment to the Social Security Act or
is it a "mere appropriations" act?
Our argument is that it is both. It is an appropriations bill because it
states that it involves only appropriations. By its own terms it only lasts
for a year and affects only the expenditure of funds. Therefore, it is gov-
erned by article I, section nine, clause seven of the Constitution. The
question the Supreme Court has to face is whether we will go so far be-
yond the abortion issue as to radically change the relationship of these
equal arms of the government. Will the Court attempt to compel Con-
gress to appropriate funds? Is the appropriations power subject to equal
protection? If so, what does that mean? We talk about the problems of
opening a Pandora's box with all of the litigation in our country. What
would happen if, for example, the appropriations power of Congress were
subject to equal protection or substantive due process under the fifth
amendment? Would that mean that everyone would be taxed at the same
rate, or that Congress could not prefer one group over another? These are
all questions the Court must wrestle with when it attempts to decide this
case. The case has gone far beyond the abortion issue presented to the
Court and involves issues of great magnitude as far as the country is
concerned.
As a matter of fact, an amicus brief was filed by John Noonan, Bill
Ball, and several other lawyers representing hundreds of members of
Congress who took a very strong stand on appropriations. More than a
majority, 238 members of the House of Representatives signed the ami-
cus curiae brief. A direct confrontation is developing between the legisla-
tive and judicial branches in this case. In addition, there are not many
cases in which members of Congress have appeared before the Court ar-
guing in support of the constitutionality of legislation which they had en-
acted. The Hyde Amendment has even greater significance for the abor-
tion issue. It has become the subject of great debate in the Congress since
1976. There is, however, a consensus developing with respect to the Hyde
13 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
" Allen v. Smith, 173 U.S. 389 (1899); United States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885).
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Amendment. It is now being passed with less difficulty than in the past.
What has also developed is a consciousness in the minds of those legisla-
tors about the issue and the nature of the Hyde Amendment. If the Court
were to hold that the language of the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits
the expenditure of federal funds for abortions, was unconstitutional
under either the fifth or the fourteenth amendment, that would be a great
blow to the development of a constitutional amendment in Congress. As a
legal matter, this is not true because if an amendment is enacted chang-
ing the Constitution, it is changed. As a practical matter, if the language
appears to be unfair, a fourteenth amendment analysis would be required.
If it violates the fourteenth amendment, then supposedly it is "unfair."
This would be a great blow to the movement itself and, consequently, to
the handling of these cases. We have determined that the first issue of
the Pro-Life movement is to win the Hyde Amendment. Thereafter, the
issue is whether a state must pay for abortions. In our opinion, if the
Court holds that the Hyde Amendment is constitutional, but finds that
under Title XIX states still must fund the abortions that the federal gov-
ernment does not, it is still a tremendous victory. Title XIX can be
changed because it is only a statutory enactment-you know how difficult
it is to try to change the Constitution. Thus, the case has great signifi-
cance in the Pro-Life movement.
There are pending issues before the Court concerning other aspects
of abortion litigation. There are eighteen to twenty cases around the
country now and I am going to discuss just a few. We have a case before
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and are awaiting a decision. It in-
volves six basic issues, the most important of which is informed consent.
We developed a new idea about informed consent in light of the older
cases where we lost on this issue. Incidentally, the case is also interesting
for those who have been litigating abortion cases because it is one of the
few times that the American Civil Liberties Union has been an appellant
in a case. The informed consent issue that we developed is this: every
woman who is to have an abortion must be provided with a small publica-
tion which will provide her with information about alternatives to abor-
tion. It will list all of the places where she can get public and private
help. It also will provide developmental knowledge of the unborn. The
bill, which has been preliminarily held constitutional by the trial court,
requires the physician to present this document to the woman. That, cou-
pled with a 24 hour waiting period, which was also upheld, gives some
opportunity for counseling in the opposite direction. Another aspect of
the bill which has been upheld is a provision involving fetal pain. The
physician must advise the woman whether the unborn has proceeded far
enough in its development to perceive pain through an abortion, and then
must offer the woman analgesics for the child. Analgesics need not be
taken, nor need they be sold-just offered. Additionally, the woman must
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be told, if prescribed a contraceptive such as the pill or an IUD, whether
it is an abortifacient and if so, what effect it has.
Another aspect of abortion development evolved in 1965 and 1966
when Planned Parenthood argued vociferously that the IUD, for example,
was not an abortifacient. In this case we can argue that it certainly is and
that is why this section of the statute should be declared
unconstitutional.
A Nebraska case is pending in the Eighth Circuit which struck down
a 48-hour waiting period. It is being appealed although we do not think it
should be. Forty-eight hours probably will not stand scrutiny. Twenty-
four hours has. The Fifth Circuit has two cases. One involves notice to
spouses in all cases. Again, this is another parameter which has been de-
cided by the courts. Spousal consent probably cannot be required, but
what about spousal notice?
Spousal notice can be coupled with a 24-hour waiting period and
therefore, provide reasonable grounds to require that the husband be no-
tified. There is another case in which parental notice is being litigated,
H.L. v. Matheson.'6 These are all issues which will be before the Supreme
Court in very short order.
The Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter6 case is tremendously im-
portant for all of us. It is not on appeal, but the plaintiff has filed a writ
of certiorari concerning his attorney's fees. Attorneys' fees are quite a
problem in this kind of litigation for an organization such as ours, or,
indeed, any organization that fights abortion through litigation. Take, for
example, the McRae case from New York. The record was approximately
3,000 pages long-the case lasted 3 years at the trial level and involved
many witnesses. If the plaintiffs are successful in having the Hyde
Amendment declared unconstitutional they undoubtedly will be seeking
attorneys' fees. One sees a potential for staggering fees being assessed
against not only the state, but also against intervenors who have been
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for the payment of attorneys' fees in
this kind of litigation. So the Mahoning Women's Center case is very im-
portant. Attorneys' fees were denied and there is now a writ of certiorari
before the Supreme Court. We contend that we have a first amendment
right to litigate these issues, and if we are going to be struck with the
payment of very large attorneys' fees at the end of the case, our first
amendment rights certainly are in jeopardy. Moreover, we will be pre-
vented from litigating these cases because of the difficulty of winning
within the parameters of Roe v. Wade, even without considering the issue
of payment of attorneys' fees.
Is 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979), prob. juris. noted, 445 U.S. 903 (1980).
I6 610 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 447 U.S. 918 (1980).
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Thus, section 1988 has had a tremendous impact on civil rights litiga-
tion. Five years ago, before the fee changes, a plaintiff who initiated a suit
would conduct reasonable discovery and work hard to settle. Now, how-
ever, the opposite occurs. Because of these amendments, a typical civil
rights case results in a 6-foot stack of discovery depositions. All kinds of
discovery will be permitted because of the way the courts assess attor-
neys' fees and because many organizations around the country do nothing
but litigate under these statutes.
Another very interesting case is the Virginia sit-in case. It is interest-
ing because it shows where we are and where we are going. There were
two or three Virginia sit-in cases where the local prosecutor decided to
discontinue prosecuting the case or where the case was dismissed by the
trial judge. The picketing of the abortion clinics continued and the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union went into federal court to enjoin the so-called
harassment. It even went so far as to sue not only the prosecutor but also
the judges to enjoin them from holding that the defendants had a defense
of necessity and, therefore, could be found not guilty. Visualize the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union selecting between the civil liberties of one side
versus the other, making a substantive judgment that the civil liberties of
the physicians in the abortion clinics supersede the rights of anyone to
have a first amendment right of association or demonstration. The dis-
trict court granted an injunction against the demonstrators. Violation of
the injunction, of course, could lead to contempt of court. There is an-
other demonstration case going on in Fort Wayne. The abortion litigation
goes on and on.
For us, of course, the McRae and Zbaraz cases have the most signifi-
cance. They go far beyond the parameters of abortion litigation. They
affect the very structure of Congress and the courts. I frequently am
asked whether I think we will win those cases. The answer is this: in 1973
abortion was legalized, and anybody who is familiar with the issue is
aware of its significance in terms of population policy, the retarded, and
the mentally ill. If you can destroy whole, healthy, hearty citizens, you
probably can destroy others. But, the implementation of abortion as a
matter of public policy is another side of that coin. To make it legal and
leave it in the private sphere is one thing, which is to say, it must be
funded by private money. Declaring the Hyde Amendment constitutional
would do two significant things. First, it would indicate that something is
wrong with abortion. It would attach a certain amount of opprobrium to
an otherwise legal act. Can those who need it as a form of public policy
endure criticism by the very institution in our government which made it
legal? Secondly, and even more significantly, those who want abortion le-
galized and were successful in having it legalized must have abortion as a
form of public policy. To have it legal and let it remain in the private
sphere is one thing, but certainly inadequate for the future as far as they
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are concerned. What they need, and what they desire is to have abortion
as a form of public policy, a form that the government can use when it
needs to use it. If it cannot be funded publicly because it is interdicted by
the Hyde Amendment or by state statutes which are constitutional, then
the whole use of this tool as a form of public policy is defeated. So, from
their point of view, these are very important cases, probably more impor-
tant than Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. 7 Without this as a public pol-
icy tool, they feel they have accomplished very little. If we look at the
cases that way, we begin to understand what is at issue, and we begin to
understand the pressure that the Court is going to feel in deciding these
two cases.
Thank you.
17 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
